Re: Suggestion: binfmt_misc handling
On Sun, Oct 03, 1999 at 11:30:04AM -0400, Raul Miller was heard to say:
> On Sun, Oct 03, 1999 at 10:06:02AM -0400, Daniel Burrows wrote:
> > [ as I understand it, a security 'breach' could only occur with this
> > system if a user had execute permissions but *not* read permissions
> > on a file that wasn't of a normal executable format; in other words:
> > rwx--x--x /usr/bin/haha-you-cant-run-me.exe or if the user normally
> > didn't have permissions to run the interpreter but had enough
> > permissions to execute files of that type. Both of these seem to me to
> > be unusual cases, but who knows? :) ]
>
> Or if the interpreter was setuid or setgid.
Unless I'm entirely confused, this is only an issue if the user can't run
the interpreter without going through binfmt_misc (ie, they have no execute
priviliges on it) -- otherwise they could just type
'/usr/bin/setuid_interpreter evil-nasty-program'
Daniel
--
Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not
become a monster. And when you look into an abyss, the abyss also looks
into you.
-- Friedrich Nietzsche
Reply to: