Re: /tmp exploits

[Ian Jackson <ian@chiark.greenend.org.uk>]

Manoj Srivastava writes ("Re: /tmp exploits"):
...
> 	I think I would want echo blah > /tmp/junk nto to start
>  failing on my just because there is a file called junk already
>  in there. Modifying libc is too deep rooted a change; and modifes the
>  semantics of /tmp in an unacceptable fashion. I think the goals are
>  laudable -- but something like this should not be unleased even on
>  unstable. 

I think noone, even humans, should type `echo blah > /tmp/junk'.  Make
a directory named after your userid, or use your home directory, or
something.

Insecure use of /tmp is still insecure when done by humans - even more
so, perhaps, because I might well be able to predict your favourite
filename well in advance much more easily than I could predict the PID
of a particular program invoked at some unknown time in the future.

Also, several people who use /tmp in this way may well clash with each
other, causing untold mayhem.


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