Hi, FUD, FUD, FUD. >>"Kai" == Kai Henningsen <kaih@khms.westfalen.de> writes: Kai> Incidentally, the general consensus of said IETF group is that it Kai> is so much of a good thing that they aren't even going to Kai> document it - except to say to ignore this. Have you actually read the discussion? Firstly, Your key can't be recovered, so it is *NOT* key escrow. Anyone who says that is either incompetent, or deliberately misleading. I think maybe it is the latter case. Second, it is an optional feature. The group is getting all hot and bothered because this is one step closer to Government Accessed Keys, and how the people holding the message recovery key have too much power (like reading the mail of everyone else). And that there is no distinction between storage keys and transmission keys (which should never be recoverable, they say. Yes, if one is that uncertain of the intent of the owner of the machine or of the person using it, sure, don't use message recovery. I guess I am not paranoid enough about the governement accessible key threat looming over all of humanity (or black helicopter that spy on me at night). Message recovery is a tool. It can be misused, like having root passwords can be misused. Anything powerful or useful can be dangerous. It is an OPTION. So we have come to censoring our userbase because we do not think they are competent enough to handle the tools that are out there? Coming to think of it. I think I like a message recovery key for me. (If someone forced me to give a key to read my data, I can give them my recovery key, and not my ME key. This is important). Why should corporations not have access to their documents no matter what? (Don't use this system for your private data, then). Message recovery can be used for good too. Kai> Somehow, I have more trust in that group's competence than in Kai> yours, in matters like this. I think you should be building your confidence in yourself, and actually looking at the issues rather than taking the word of a god-guru. Just because they can send mail to majordomo does not make them competent. (I know the same argument applies to me too. So look for yourself and decide). manoj Apart from the essay below, also look at <URL:http://www.imc.org/ietf-open-pgp/mail-archive/0228.html>
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-- They are all fickle but one, sir. A West Point Cadet's answer to, "How are they all?" (Suggestions as to what this could have meant are appreciated). Manoj Srivastava <srivasta@acm.org> <http://www.datasync.com/%7Esrivasta/> Key C7261095 fingerprint = CB D9 F4 12 68 07 E4 05 CC 2D 27 12 1D F5 E8 6E