Re: [Moshe Zadka <m@moshez.org>] Independent Count
On Mon, 24 Mar 2003, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
> >> Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@debian.org> said:
> > And to allow that, we need to change voting procedures, to preserve
> > secrecy of the voting... the ballots would have to be cyphertext,
> > with a signature wrapping the cyphertext, or something to that
> > effect.
Note that I didn't say that we *should* do that. I should have said "we'd
need to change..." but my english failed me.
> someone they are close to). If the candidates can't see the
> results, does it matter if more than one person can see the
The Debian admin team will always be able to get past any scheme we might
try anyway (I consider moot the idea of 3rd parties in this), if they feel
so inclined. Perfect secrecy isn't attainable.
> b) The cost of correctly voting. Already we have a higher than
> previously ration of rejected votes. encrypting the vote to a
> voting key, and wrapping that another signed message, would
> likely make voting too difficult for a number of people.
Hmm, are we a technically-inclined project or not?
Rejections are no big deal. People can send the vote again to correct simple
mistakes. All it takes is not trying to do it at the last possible
minute...
And I seriously doubt anyone in the project would be unable to get the
process right after some tries. I would expect most to get it right at the
first time, actually.
> c) All this would need tested, working code in devotee before next
> elections, nu?
If anyone were to push this thing? Most definately :-) I certainly won't
bother, it doesn't seem necessary right now.
--
"One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
where the shadows lie." -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
Henrique Holschuh
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