[dak/master] Fix the is_dm check to deal with the fact we have typing in our DB layer
This code is still fundamentally wrong (assuming unknown UIDs are DDs is
idiotic; of course we know that the keys have had to pass the sig check
against the keyring so it's not a security issue thankfully; it just
might give a one shot limited window for DMs to upload non-DM packages)
Signed-off-by: Mark Hymers <mhy@debian.org>
---
dak/process_unchecked.py | 17 +++++++++++------
1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dak/process_unchecked.py b/dak/process_unchecked.py
index 8f9857f..403f140 100755
--- a/dak/process_unchecked.py
+++ b/dak/process_unchecked.py
@@ -1014,7 +1014,7 @@ def lookup_uid_from_fingerprint(fpr):
if qs:
return qs
else:
- return (None, None, None)
+ return (None, None, False)
def check_signed_by_key():
"""Ensure the .changes is signed by an authorized uploader."""
@@ -1024,17 +1024,22 @@ def check_signed_by_key():
uid_name = ""
# match claimed name with actual name:
- if uid == None:
+ if uid is None:
+ # This is fundamentally broken but need us to refactor how we get
+ # the UIDs/Fingerprints in order for us to fix it properly
uid, uid_email = changes["fingerprint"], uid
may_nmu, may_sponsor = 1, 1
# XXX by default new dds don't have a fingerprint/uid in the db atm,
# and can't get one in there if we don't allow nmu/sponsorship
- elif is_dm is "t":
- uid_email = uid
- may_nmu, may_sponsor = 0, 0
- else:
+ elif is_dm is False:
+ # If is_dm is False, we allow full upload rights
uid_email = "%s@debian.org" % (uid)
may_nmu, may_sponsor = 1, 1
+ else:
+ # Assume limited upload rights unless we've discovered otherwise
+ uid_email = uid
+ may_nmu, may_sponsor = 0, 0
+
if uid_email in [changes["maintaineremail"], changes["changedbyemail"]]:
sponsored = 0
--
1.5.6.5
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