[Date Prev][Date Next] [Thread Prev][Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]

Re: Bug#636783: proposed constitution fix for super-majority within the tech ctte



Hmm, apparently I can only mail -ctte under my older address? Trying
again... (bug and Andi not cc'ed to avoid dupes)

On Sat, Aug 6, 2011 at 07:48, Andreas Barth <aba@not.so.argh.org> wrote:
> Therefor, I propose to replace this by:
>
> A.6.3.2:
> | An option A defeats the default option D by a majority ratio of 1,
> | if V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A). An option A defeats the
> | default option D by a majority ratio of N, if V(A,D) is equals or
> | greater than N * V(D,A).
> (I don't like the ways it's written - better ideas?)

I don't think it makes sense to have different rules for when M=1 to
when M=!1; so I'd suggest having a separate "supermajority ratio" that
does the >= thing, and is never =1.
Here's a possible patch (fingers crossed that gmail doesn't screw it
up too badly)

 --- /usr/share/doc/debian/constitution.txt     2010-01-12
07:14:08.000000000 +1000
+++ supercons.txt       2011-08-06 15:56:35.593975118 +1000
@@ -81,11 +81,11 @@

   Together, the Developers may:
    1. Appoint or recall the Project Leader.
-    2. Amend this constitution, provided they agree with a 3:1 majority.
+    2. Amend this constitution, provided they agree with a 3:1 supermajority.
    3. Make or override any decision authorised by the powers of the
       Project Leader or a Delegate.
    4. Make or override any decision authorised by the powers of the
-       Technical Committee, provided they agree with a 2:1 majority.
+       Technical Committee, provided they agree with a 2:1 supermajority.
    5. Issue, supersede and withdraw nontechnical policy documents and
       statements.
       These include documents describing the goals of the project, its
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
            critical to the Project's mission and purposes.
         2. The Foundation Documents are the works entitled "Debian Social
            Contract" and "Debian Free Software Guidelines".
-         3. A Foundation Document requires a 3:1 majority for its
+         3. A Foundation Document requires a 3:1 supermajority for its
            supersession. New Foundation Documents are issued and existing
            ones withdrawn by amending the list of Foundation Documents in
            this constitution.
@@ -256,10 +256,10 @@
    3. Make a decision when asked to do so.
       Any person or body may delegate a decision of their own to the
       Technical Committee, or seek advice from it.
-    4. Overrule a Developer (requires a 3:1 majority).
+    4. Overrule a Developer (requires a 3:1 supermajority).
       The Technical Committee may ask a Developer to take a particular
       technical course of action even if the Developer does not wish to;
-       this requires a 3:1 majority. For example, the Committee may
+       this requires a 3:1 supermajority. For example, the Committee may
       determine that a complaint made by the submitter of a bug is
       justified and that the submitter's proposed solution should be
       implemented.
@@ -518,8 +518,6 @@
       ballot that includes an option for the original resolution, each
       amendment, and the default option (where applicable).
    2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
-       Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
-       have a 1:1 majority requirement.
    3. The votes are counted according to the rules in A.6. The default
       option is "Further Discussion", unless specified otherwise.
    4. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters of
@@ -561,13 +559,13 @@
       default option which do not receive at least R votes ranking that
       option above the default option are dropped from consideration.
    3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default option
-       by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
+       is dropped from consideration.
         1. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters who
            prefer option A over option B.
-         2. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority ratio
-            N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
-         3. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority
-            ratio is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
+         2. An option A defeats the default option D provided that:
+              (a) V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A); and
+              (b) if a supermajority of N:1 is required, then V(A,D)
+                  is greater than or equal to N * V(D/A).
    4. From the list of undropped options, we generate a list of pairwise
       defeats.
         1. An option A defeats an option B, if V(A,B) is strictly greater
@@ -601,8 +599,8 @@
   When the Standard Resolution Procedure is to be used, the text which
   refers to it must specify what is sufficient to have a draft resolution
   proposed and/or sponsored, what the minimum discussion period is, and
-   what the voting period is. It must also specify any supermajority
-   and/or the quorum (and default option) to be used.
+   what the voting period is. It must also specify the default option to be
+   used, the quorum required, and any supermajority requirements.

 B. Use of language and typography

Cheers,
aj

--
Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>



-- 
Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>


Reply to: