[Date Prev][Date Next] [Thread Prev][Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]

Bug#841842: debian-installer: should use EXT4's native file-system-level encryption



On 6/25/2017 4:19 AM, Cyril Brulebois wrote:
> Marcos Mobley <marcosmobley@dipconsultants.com> (2016-10-23):
>> it would be nice to be able to use EXT4's native file-system-level
>> encryption instead of LUKS.
> 
> As far as I understand it, this would only protect the contents of a
> given directory instead of the whole filesystem, so that doesn't look
> like a suitable replacement for LUKS?
> 
> If my quick research is correct (you didn't much information in your bug
> report), then I think the admin is supposed to be setting this up; and
> that's not really a job for the Debian Installer.

To replace LUKS as an FDE mode we'd first need support in
initramfs-tools to load a key into the kernel's keyring on boot.

But in general ext4 fs-level encryption is "weird" in that the
encryption secret is stored in the login keyring. That makes sense in
the Android world for which it was designed but complicates matters
somewhat on a plain Linux system and has "interesting" behavior
depending if the file you're trying to access is already loaded into the
page cache or not. (As there's a secret you need to have activated in
addition to fs-level permission bits, which are actually separate.) I
think something like pam_e4crypt for the encryption of the user's home
directory would make more sense to support.

I think that nested policies aren't actually supported. I'm also unsure
if setting the policy at the root inode works or not. (And I tried to
confirm both questions, but encryption didn't work with loop filesystems
because of the blocksize, unfortunately.)

Kind regards
Philipp Kern

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature


Reply to: