Hi Stefan :) On Sun, 2012-09-16 at 10:31 +0200, Stefan Fritsch wrote: > Browsers now have a workaround that splits/inserts TLS records that > cause the IV to be changed. So this works also with CBC ciphers. Yeah I new,... > This > is basically the same what openssl does since before 0.9.6. ... I just looked at it from the perspective of the server operator... and from that I also want to "enforce", that things are secured when a user would use a browser without that workaround :) > http://my.opera.com/securitygroup/blog/2011/12/11/opera-11-60-and-new- > problems-with-some-secure-servers Thanks... nice post. > Unless you forbid CBC ciphers, I don't think you can do anything on > the server. Uhm... I thought openssl >=0.9.6. alone would already secure things? > But > forbidding the CBC ciphers gives up perfect forward secrecy Yep... > The fix/workaround needs to be done by the browser. Ah... I see... so what openssl did was with respect to it acting as a SS/TLS1.0 client?! I guess in principle one could deactivate SSLv3 and TLS1.0 on the browser side,... to force things being secure (with respect to BEAST at least), right? Cheers, Chris.
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