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Re: code injection in packages.debian.org



On Tue, Dec 12, 2006 at 11:35:38PM +0100, Christian Boltz wrote:
> > ? That would  generate HTML files that point to content that do no
> > exist in the any of the mirrors.  The only way you can make those
> > file valids if you break into one of the mirrors, and if a mirror is
> > broken and you do not do per-release GPG checks of the archive your
> > injection method is really pointless.
> 
> It wouldn't be the first time a debian server is cracked :-/

In order for your md5sum "attack" to really work you have to crack *all*
mirrors or the user has a ~1/38 chance on stumbling on the package that has
been replaced by a cracker. Not a very good attack IMHO.

As for "debian servers being cracked" I don't know about you, but I have not
see too many notices sent to -announce saying that a mirror has been cracked.
Only some Debian servers (not mirrors) have been compromised (mostly
gluck.debian.org) but never ftp-master.debian.org

Anyway, we could be discussing about this for days. I agree that the md5sum
should not be taken verbatim from the user's input but, I understand, that's
something that is fixed in the next release of the scripts. If other's think
this should be fixed *right*now* then I think the only sensible option is to
remove the md5sum information from the download page altogether and put it
in the packages page with the autogenerated content in a cell next to
"Installed size".


Regards

Javier

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