Re: current A.6 draft [examples]

[Raul Miller <moth@debian.org>]

On Mon, Dec 09, 2002 at 03:03:33AM +1100, Clinton Mead wrote:
> In any case, later on I'll define another criteria in my opinion an 
> election system should follow, and will attempt to prove that CCSSD (and 
> newly defined DPCCSSD) does follow and the Dec 7 draft does not. This 
> criteria 'Consistancy', is basically that if an option wins when it is 
> not the default option, it should win when it is the default option.

What's the rationale for this system?

In other words, you're stipulating that for an election where A has 3:1
supermajority, and D is the default option, and the votes are

100 ABD
 35 BAD

that B should win, even though every voter considers A to be an acceptable
option.  Why is this a good idea?

That said, here's how the test case you've proposed here plays out with
the draft I submitted today:

______________________________________________________________________

A is the default option
4 CBA
3 BAC
2 ACB

B defeats A 7:2
C defeats B 6:3
A defeats C 5:4

eliminate 5:4

B defeats A 7:2
C defeats B 6:3

C wins
______________________________________________________________________

B is the default option
4 CBA
3 BAC
2 ACB

B defeats A 7:2
C defeats B 6:3
A defeats C 5:4

eliminate 5:4

B defeats A 7:2
C defeats B 6:3

C wins
______________________________________________________________________

Finally, as an aside: I've been avoiding the beatpath strength mechanism
because I'm not confident of the logic which proves it's equivalent to
CpSSD in an election with supermajorities.

Good enough?

Thanks,

-- 
Raul