On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 12:39:27PM -0600, Manoj Srivastava wrote: > Interesting. However, that paper makes a number of assumptions > > May (1952) shows that majority rule is the only positively > responsive voting rule that satisfies anonymity (all voters are > treated equally) and neutrality (all alternatives are treated > equally). If we use a system other than majority rule, then we > lose either anonymity or neutrality. > > Eh? this obviously does not apply. It isn't even the central thesis of the paper, so I'm not sure what you're really establishing here. Our voting system does not have anonymity, except in Project Leader elections (well, in theory anyway[1]), which are already conducted under a simple majority requirement and wouldn't be impacted by a proposal to eliminate supermajority requirements from the Constitution. So, the remaining question is, do we lose "neutrality"? > Additionally, the core of the argument is about bargaining powers, No, it isn't. The core of the argument is that supermajorities prevent consensus from being expressed through minorities' defense of their positions. Our thinking about majority rule has been considerably sharpened by formal social choice theory. As already noted, May (1952) shows that majority rule is the only positively responsive decision rule satisfying anonymity and neutrality. In a similar vein, Rae (1969) and Taylor (1969) show that majority rule is the decision rule that minimizes the probability that an agent votes for something that is not enacted or votes against something that is. Straffin (1977) shows that majority rule is the decision rule that maximizes responsiveness to individual preferences. Social choice theory has demonstrated that majority rule is prone to cycles (Condorcet 1788/1955; Arrow 1952; Plott 1967; McKelvey 1976, 1979; Schofield 1978). The conditions under which this applies to super-majoritarian decision rules has been explored by Nakamura (1979), Greenberg (1979) and Schofield et al. (1988). Miller (1980) and McKelvey (1986) show there are strict limits to majority rule cycling under normal institutional settings, and Miller (1983) argues that the instability produced by cycling may actually beneficial to systemic stability by assuring that there are no permanent losers. Laing and Slotznick (1987) show that under super-majoritarian rules, it may be strategically rational for blocking minorities to defend extreme status quo positions, even though they would like to see them replaced. Note especially the last sentence. Is insincerity really a feature we want in our voting system? > which apply to places like > traditionally elected bodies (parliaments, etc), where people whose > votes can't be bargained for to reach super majority lose out. What are we doing in all these discussions if it isn't "bargaining"? While we do not barter in tangible goods or promises for same, we split into groups, gather ourselves around certain positions, and sometimes even horse-trade (as I did in response to Raul's suggestion about quorum requirements). We're not bargaining for construction projects or tax breaks, we're bargaining for the votes themselves, because of the outcomes we'd like to see. > This is by no means relevant to Debian's voting process. I disagree; it's spot-on relevant. You might be right if none of us participated in any discussion, and were handed ballots without any prior knowledge of who stood in support of which positions. But that's not how Debian works. We discuss things to death and it doesn't take long to figure out who supports which positions. It certainly becomes clear after the vote, when the ballots are published, so should a similar issue ever arise again, the well of blissful ignorance is certainly poisoned. > Additionally, the minorities are hurt position presupposes the > minorities are the minorites in the US population, and the status quo > is bad for them; this is arguably not relevant in the case of debian. No, while the paper makes some asides about ethnic minorities in U.S. politics, when it says "minority" in general, that's what it means -- the literal minority of voters. When the paper says "majority rule", is it your assertion that it means "rule by white people"? Here, let's count up uses of the word "minority" in the first quarter of the paper; there are ten: This paper demonstrates that majority rule offers more protection to the worst-off minority Nope. for the worst-off minority. Dahl (1956, 1988) argues that the values of popular sovereignty Nope. protection of minority rights and stability. Thus it is commonly argued that there is a trade- Yup, probably. off between political equality (maximized by majority rule) and minority protection (better Yup, probably. Federalist 10, Madison identifies the problems of minority and majority tyranny. The Nope. republican principle (i.e., majority rule) protects against minority tyranny. However, the Nope. (arguing that it reversed the principle of free government and equaled minority rule3), as well Nope. relies on majority rule to protect against minority tyranny. Dahl argues that in cases where Nope. minority rights. This is somewhat ironic given that super-majoritarian rules, such as the Yup. area becomes the core. The influence of one minority (the two voters at position a and b) has Nope. Furthermore, the references to ethnic minorities are in the context of points the author of the paper is rebutting! "...there are other values that we need to take into account besides popular sovereignty and political equality, notably the protection of minority rights and stability. Thus it is commonly argued that there is a trade- off between political equality (maximized by majority rule) and minority protection (better provided by systems with external checks and balances, which require more than a simple majority to enact legislation). This paper argues that this trade-off does not exist and that actually majority rule provides most protection to minorities." "Guineer (1994) argues that super-majoritarian voting may be one means to protect minority rights. This is somewhat ironic given that super-majoritarian rules, such as the filibuster in the Senate, have been historically employed to obstruct civil rights legislation." Your first point seems entirely specious. It doesn't matter to Debian whether the minorities we seek to protect are racial or generic. Neither does it matter to the author of the paper, who is arguing *against* the position that supermajoritiarism protects ethnic minorities. Your second point does at least attempt to take on a real issue, for which I thank you: > Secondly, it says that supermajorities are biased with > reference to the status quo -- which is, indeed, desired: we do > put supermajority requirements only on documents and decisions where > the status quo was arrived after a great deal of delibration, and has > been adopted by the full membership, and indeed, forms the core of > the project. A point directly rebutted by the paper. "With super-majority voting, the status quo is privilegedif there is no alternative for which a super-majority votes, the status quo is maintained. Following Rae's (1975) argument, given that the status quo is more desirable to some voters than to others, some voters are effectively privileged. It is certainly the case that super-majority rules can privilege (protect, if you prefer) some voters. Unfortunately, it is not possible to privilege every group over every other group. If super-majority rules create a privileged group, there must be a corresponding under-privileged group." "Using some simple examples, we can illustrate some of the problems that super-majoritarian rules can produce. Such rules can lead to the complete exclusion of minorities, to immobilism where the status quo is impossible to challenge, to situations where ideologically concentrated minorities are advantaged over more dispersed majorities, and even to situations where points at the very extremes are strategically defended by blocking coalitions." "Majority rule offers most protection to minorities because it makes it easiest for a minority to form a coalition that can overturn an unacceptable outcome. Super-majority rules can certainly protect (or rather privilege) some minorities, but only at the expense of others. It is not logically possible for every minority to be privileged over every other minority." (etc.) > The status Quo, in the case of the DFSG+SC, defines what our > philosophies are, and they tread a fine line between extreme > positions on either side. Exactly the sort of goal the paper argues is achieved through simple majoritarianism: "Laing and Slotznick (1987) show that under super-majoritarian rules, it may be strategically rational for blocking minorities to defend extreme status quo positions, even though they would like to see them replaced." "[Super-majoritiarian] rules can lead...to situations where points at the very extremes are strategically defended by blocking coalitions." Is it your assertion that Debian's salvation and preservation of identity lies with an especially esteemed minority group? Have we already been overrun by a group of developers, a group now comprising the majority, who are all too willing to sacrifice our identity to so-called pragmatic concerns? > Being biased towards what has lead to the > creation of a fine OS, and seems to have caused little (in my > opinion) in the way of a crisis, seems to be a fine thing. And your arguments do nothing to establish that super-majoritarianism has had anything to do with this. An amendement to the Constitution, Social Contract, or DFSG has never even come to a vote. > The paper has failed to consvince me. It doesn't appear to me that you've even read it very carefully, unfortunately. You reiterate the very points it refutes. > It also deals with concepts of economic efficiency, and whether > filibusters in the US senate have been used to oppose civil liberty > laws, and thus do not protect minorities. Both of which are explicitly identified as asides in the paper, for the purpose of referring to real-world situations such that the reader can see how the paper, which is a theoretical one, can be applied to concrete issues. I encourage people to actually read the paper instead of taking your representations of its focus as accurate. http://www.democ.uci.edu/democ/papers/McGann02.pdf It would be nice if someone could offer a dissenting view on the paper that actually addressed its reasoning, instead of talking past it. I could still be persuaded that it's snake oil, for instance, but bare assertions like Manoj's are going to be insufficient to do so. [1] Hi, Raul :) -- G. Branden Robinson | You should try building some of the Debian GNU/Linux | stuff in main that is branden@debian.org | modern...turning on -Wall is like http://people.debian.org/~branden/ | turning on the pain. -- James Troup
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