Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 01:44:33AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> The reason I'm not accepting your interpretation, or considering it
> at all reasonable, is that I'm still not seeing any basis for your
> interpretation than that it comes up with the right answer.
I'd say "plausible answer" instead of right answer -- your interpretation
does not come up with a plausible answer.
I suppose a part of the problem also lies with the word "prefer". [Do
transitive ranking characteristics indicate preference? The constitution
doesn't explicitly say.]
> Why not simply define the terms as they are used by the people who care
> about these things, and then clearly express the procedure by which ties
> should be dealt with, rather than defining them out of existance?
> A.6(2) An option A is said to Dominate another option B, if
> there are more votes which rank option A above option B
> than there are votes which rank option B above option A.
> A.6(2a) The Smith Set of options in a vote is the smallest
> non-empty set of options, each of which Dominates every
> option not in the Smith Set.
> A.6(3) If there is only one option in the Smith Set, it is
> the winner.
> This still leaves the more important problem of how to handle related
> (opposing) options in a single vote unaddressed, however. I'm further
> inclined to suspect that using Single Transferable Vote to choose the
> winner from the Smith Set isn't ideal, but I don't know enough about
> the alternatives to give a basis for that suspicion.
Single Transferable Vote biases the selection in favor of first
preferences at the expense of other preferences. Can you think of a
better kind of criteria for making the selection? Or, can you construct
an example where you feel that Single Transferable Vote seems unfair?