Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
> On Thu, Nov 23, 2000 at 10:58:28PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 24, 2000 at 10:07:24AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > > Consider another possible vote outcome:
> > > 60 votes A
> > > 21 votes BAF
> > > in which case:
> > Yep -- A didn't win by 3 to 1.
> > 3:1 supermajority requires a near unanomous agreement among those voting.
On Fri, Nov 24, 2000 at 02:44:40PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
> This works okay when the alternative selected is the status-quo or further
> discussion (which is what the constitution describes).
>
> In the above case, though, you've got *completely* unanimous agreement
> that A is acceptable, and an almost 3:1 majority that says A is the best
> option.
Almost 3:1 but still less than 3:1
Of course, if B is independent from A then it should be on an
independent ballot.
> Following the constitution, you'd have two votes:
> Which form should the general resolution take? ABF
> which A would win comfortably by a clear majority (the supermajority stuff
> only matters for the final vote, see A.6(7)), and
> The developers resolve that "A": YNF
> which would presumably have a unanimous "yes" vote.
This would be true for situations where "B is independent from A" is
itself a questionable issue.
> The idea is to end up with a voting process that's at least as fair, but
> gets the result after a single vote (so that people aren't encouraged
> to vote for something they don't really prefer in hopes of making sure
> something else fails).
You're never going to have a single process which unambiguously resolves
all potential ambiguities. However, I guess I understand where you're
coming from.
> If you consider how:
> 60 votes, ABF
> 30 votes, BFA
> might turn out under the current constitution (again where A requires
> 3:1 supermajority, B requires simple majority to pass), you'd have:
> A dominates B, 60 to 30
My guess here is that you think that A.6(2) applies sequentially before
A.6(7). Which would mean that A.6(7) doesn't really apply to anything at
all (since A.6(5) and A.6(6) both would apply before A.6(7)). Personally,
I'm uncomfortable with the idea that A.6(7) is a part of the constitution
that should never be applied.
With a 3:1 supermajority over B, and 60 ABF votes, B dominates A, 30 to 20.
> A dominates F, 60 to 30
F dominates A, 30 to 20.
> B dominates F, 90 to 0
Yep.
> in which case at the moment, you'd have an initial vote which A would win
> (simple majority, A dominates all others), and a final vote, where the result
> would probably be something like:
> 60 votes: YFN or YNF (the 60 people who prefer A to everything else)
> 30 votes: NFY or FNY or FYN (the 30 people who prefer F to A)
> which would be reduced to:
> F dominates Y, 30 to 20
> and results in either an F or N victory.
>
> Just reducing the votes for A by 3 right at the start would result in:
> B dominates A, 30 to 20
> F dominates A, 30 to 20
> B dominates F, 90 to 0
> and B would win by dominating all others, in spite of a 2:1 majority
> prefering A.
Right -- though I don't understand why you think this doesn't represent
the current constitution (or maybe I do -- see below). And, 2:1 majority
for A is less than the 3:1 supermajority you specified. [By the way
since you didn't specify it, I'm going to imagine a quorum of 25 on
these ballots -- which doesn't affect this particular sample ballot.]
> Another example would be votes something like:
> 60 votes ABF
> 20 votes BAF
> 15 votes BFA
> which would leave you with, respectively:
> A dominates B, 60 to 35
If there's a 3:1 supermajority, B dominates A, 35 to 20.
> A dominates F, 80 to 15
If there's a 3:1 supermajority, A dominates F 26+2/3 to 15. But F is
our default option and there's a quorum of 25, so if A wins we'd not be
forgetting about F, completely.
> B dominates F, 95 to 0
Yep.
> and a final vote something like:
> ~80 votes for
> ~15 votes against
> which is a successful 3:1 supermajority, so it'd pass.
Obviously, I disagree. Your interpretation seems to rely on
applying the stanzas of A.6 in sequence, which effectively
nullifies the higher-numbered stanzas.
> Dividing the initial vote, you'd end up with:
> B dominates A, 35 to 20
> A dominates F, ~26 to 15
> B dominates F, 95 to 0
> B wins by dominating all others.
This I agree with.
> > If you want to proceed down that route, either you eliminate B (since
> > A:B domination "dominates" all the other pairwise matchings) or you
> > postpone handling of this step because it's trivial.
>
> A.6
> 2. Option A is said to Dominate option B if strictly more ballots
> prefer A to B than prefer B to A.
>
> Ballot options can dominate each other; the degree of domination isn't
> taken into account by the constitution, although it is by the various
> Condorcet schemes out there (there's some references at the start of
> this thread).
Right -- this is an interpretation of the constitution issue, and thus
in the hands of the secretary.
> > If that turns out to be too ambiguous, perhaps we need a
> > constitutional ammendment?
>
> That's the general idea.
Ok.
Do you have a problem with my view -- that A.6(1..8) apply simultaneously
(as applicable), or are you going to insist that they be applied in
a rigid order?
[Aside: have you ever done any frames-based ai programming?]
> > > A.6(4) doesn't apply since nothing dominates all others, A.6(5)
> > > doesn't apply since there aren't any options remaining. A.6(6) could
> > > apply, I suppose, in which case any of A, B or C would win depending
> > > on what the DPL decided.
> > Nothing in the constitution says A.6(5) must happen after A.6(3).
>
> I'm not sure how that'd make sense. A.6(5) only applies if there's
> `more than one option remaining', but presumably that means there has
> to have been a chance that some options have already been eliminated,
> which can only happen if A.6(3) is applied. The "now" also seems to
> imply that these options are expected to be done in order. *shrug*
I don't see how eliminating all the options makes sense. I'm much more
comfortable eliminating no options than I am eliminating all options.
I take the "now" in A.6(5) as an important part of the fact that A.6(5)
can be applied more than once, and those iterative applications must be
in sequence.
> > > And I'm not trying to describe what the constitution says happens
> > > because I think it's broken. I'm trying to understand what *should*
> > > happen.
> > Then why did you say (near the top) that you're not referring to the
> > system described in the constitution?
>
> I'm more interested in seeing what the constitution *should* say, not what
> it does say, atm.
I guess I'm uncomfortable with that approach, because I don't have the
idea that you fully understand what it does say. You can't do a very
good job of fixing something if you can't distinguish what aspects of
it are working and what aspects are problems.
Thanks,
--
Raul
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