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Re: safety of encrypted filesystems



also sprach Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> [2005.06.17.0915 +0200]:
> no, this is subtly wrong. the *encrypted* block affects the decryption of the 
> block following it, not the cleartext block.
> 
> one dead block spills junk all over the block+1 when decrypted, 
> but the (undamaged) encrypted block+1 is used to decrypt block+2 and
> so on.

Ah, yeah, this makes perfect sense. I *knew* it even. I simply
failed to see the big picture.

So encrypted block devices are not really more dangerous than
clear-text in the end... I suppose with AES you end up losing at
least 64 bytes of data, which could be less without encryption...

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