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Re: Signature strength of .dsc



Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li> writes:

> On Mon, Dec 04, 2023 at 11:07:38AM +0100, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>> Judit Foglszinger <urbec@riseup.net> writes:
>> >> > Dmitri, could you re-run the numbers with the debian-maintainer
>> >> > keyring?
>> >> 
>> >> That is correct. I have updated the results now.  The 2,455 no
>> >> public key has now become 1,238
>> >
>> > Another is the DN keyring.  Also I'd expect many keys to be found in
>> > older versions of the keyring package/keyring repository and on
>> > keyservers like keyserver.ubuntu.com
>> 
>> Removing old keys is usually a bad idea -- could these be moved to a
>> "archived" keyring instead?  I assume having them in the "live"
>> keyring is not possible if the presence of a key in that file is used
>> to make authorization decisions.
>> 
>> You want to be able to verify old signatures in 20+ years too, and
>> then you need to be able to find the corresponding public key.
>
> For a long time we had a "removed" keyring, but we decided that we
> didn't want to continue shipping a keyring that was explicitly a set of
> keys we could not vouch for the trust of (whether that be because they
> were revoked, lost, weak, or whatever). If you really want to find old
> keys there is 15+ years of history in the keyring git repository, as
> Judit mentioned:
>
> https://salsa.debian.org/debian-keyring/keyring/

I think that is unfortunate and not sustainable over time: you need to
have access to the public keys to verify old signatures, and for as long
as the old signatures are published we should make a public keyring for
them easily available.  Which I suspect means essentially forever, due
to archive.debian.org.

I don't think it doesn't really matter of the old public key is weak or
invalid: if we know of a public key published at the time as some
signature that was possible to verify using software available at that
time, we should publish that public key.

Was there a real practical situations that couldn't be resolved that
lead to dropping the "removed" keyring?  What was the details?  Maybe
this decision could be reverted with some effort.

/Simon

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