[Date Prev][Date Next] [Thread Prev][Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]

Re: client-side signature checking of Debian archives (Re: When should we https our mirrors?)



On 2016-11-05 22:23, Adrian Bunk wrote:
The solution you are trying to sell is apt-transport-https as default.
[...]
Your solution would be a lot of work with relatively little improvement.

Well, the client-side exists and works. Then it boils down if the mirror sponsors would be willing to offer HTTPS in general and from there the operational challenges of having the right certs available. Something like httpredir would have had it easier because it redirected to canonical names owned by the sponsors for which they could offer HTTPS.

(Not limited to security) it is usually worth the effort to start by
properly formulating the problem(s) that should be solved, instead of
limiting yourself to some solutions.

While I generally agree with that statement and see it violated quite often myself, you should also give others in the discussion the benefit of the doubt here.

BTW: The "possible low-effort improvement without tradeoff" is:

Is apt-transport-tor working reliably enough for general usage?
Are security updates available immediately through apt-transport-tor?
Is there a good reason why apt-transport-tor is not mentioned
at the frontpage of http://www.debian.org/security/ ?

My current impression (that might be wrong) is that the technical side
would be available, only documentation and perhaps PR (e.g. email to
debian-security-announce) are missing.

If we are limiting ourselves to mirrors run by DSA (which is what happens for the backends of the onion balancer), we could have the same with an HTTPS-based solution just fine. It'd likely raise the same scalability and operational questions as HTTPS. Your proposal here simply has different tradeoffs, not none as you claim.

Kind regards
Philipp Kern


Reply to: