RE: PUBLIC GNUPG KEY REVOCATION FOR DAVID D.W. DOWNEY
Well, here's the problem. My A:\ was shot and I did not have the burner
at the time the drive went.
Backing it up was not an option. Yes, it could have gone on some
networked system somewhere..BUT I will not put my **secret** key on a
system *I* do not *directly* control.
Sorry but that's like inviting the thief to come steal the chickens. So,
what this amounts to is that my only backup was on the very system that
blew out. This now means I have a dead key that the package is signed
with with no revocation certificate with which to revoke it.
This leaves me with 3 things I can do. I can email the list notifying
all parties that this would affect that the incident took place and that
the key is no longer valid. I've done this. I've already attempted to
have the key removed from the keyservers but can not since no single
point of contact can ensure that the requested key will be removed since
no single authority has revokation capabilities on all servers. So, this
notification will have to suffice.
Next, I will generate a new key and resign package 0.5.2-2 with it and
add the original public key as an additional file with an entry in the
changelog stating that INVALID-GPG-KEY is the public key to which the
secret key was lost. This ties both the old key and the new key into the
package. This way folks get the old public key WITH the package and they
can then import it and mark it as untrustable. This will serve as a
partial revocation. I also suggest that the same be done on the keyring
server(s) as well. Also, by stating this here on the list, this also
becomes part of the public record and thus searchable in the archives
should anyone wish to follow the rise and death of the original key and
the rise of the new key. And last, but not least, this will ensure that
both the upstream source site (which I control) and the Debian GNU/Linux
archives (which the Debian Project controls) both have this same
information.
Lastly, I now have a CDRW. (I opted for the burner rather than a floppy
drive for obvious reasons, namely size of useable space.) I will
immediately upon generating the key ALSO create a revocation certificate
and place the secret + public keys and the revocation certificate on
this CDRW. This will then be kept in a physical-world location to be
used in the event that something like this should happen again. This way
I can also periodically erase the keys and reburn an updated copy to
disk along with the revocation certificate.
David D.W. Downey ("pgpkeys") <david-downey@codecastle.com>
Debian GNU/Linux Maintainer: libpam-pgsql|pam-pgsql
http://libpam-pgsql.codecastle.com
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