Restated to fix comments received.
For formality, to the extent that I am able, I withdraw my previous
amendment.
As I discussed, in Andreas's resolution, I think that the strategic
voting fix introduces more problems than it serves. INstead, I propose
that we don't fix that, but trust ourselves to propose ballot options
that are statement-of-the-day-like ballot options not requiring a
super-majority when doing so is wise. I think that doing so is
generally a good idea when you have a super-majority option and its
opposite on the same ballot--when there is substantial contraversy about
whether to move in the direction of the super-majority option or some
other option on the same ballot.
I have chosen to retain the preference for the default option in the TC.
If four members of the TC really cannot live with an option, we're
better off with more discussion or taking it to a GR.
Even in the Init system discussion, which I think is the most
controversial decision to come before the TC, several of the TC members
who preferred options that did not win explained what changes would need
to be made for them to consider options similar to the one that won to
be acceptable (ranked above FD).
As it happened, four TC members didn't think no decision was better than
the decision we got: if four members had ranked the winning option below
FD, the chair would not have had the opportunity to use his casting
vote.
We also have some strong evidence from emails where some TC members
explained their balloting decisions including what they ranked above FD
that the tactical voting people were afraid of didn't happen.
We're actually quite good at deciding whether another round of painful
discussion is worth the cost or not, and when people we've appointed to
make these decision decide that it is, I'd rather not second guess them.
Specifically, I formally propose to replace the GR text with:
----- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS -----
Constitutional Amendment: TC Supermajority Fix
Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical
Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1.
Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a
off-by-one error. In the new text a supermajority requirement is met
only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly
greater than the supermajority ratio.
In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a
developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single
dissenter. And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two
dissenters could be outvoted by all 6 remaining members; now that
is no longer possible.
This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent
of the Constitution, and is unhelpful.
For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any
votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical
Committee) in progress at the time the change is made.
Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows:
Index: doc/constitution.wml
===================================================================
--- doc/constitution.wml (revision 10982)
+++ doc/constitution.wml (working copy)
@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@
</li>
<li>
An option A defeats the default option D by a majority
- ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
+ ratio N, if V(A,D) is greater or equal to N * V(D,A) and V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A).
</li>
<li>
If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority ratio
Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering.
The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1.
This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is
undesirable.
Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment:
- Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0.
----- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS -----
Attachment:
pgpYAB8RsAUGk.pgp
Description: PGP signature