[Freedombox-discuss] CCC Meeting Notes
On Mon, 2011-08-15 at 15:40 +0200, Isaac Wilder wrote:
> 4) Persistent Names (which don't rely on existing DNS)
>
> a)Name resolution based on a DHT. Problem with table poisoning
> could be approached by authorizing and authenticating those that
> participate in the resolution table. This would still introduce a
> degree of hierarchy, but it would be far more distributed than
> what we have now.
> b)Use TOR hidden services. This solution is good for those that
> are running tor, but otherwise require use of tor-to-web. Also,
> the .onion names are not human-readable, so would require further
> resolution via the mechanism above, or existing DNS. This was a
> topic of much controversy. Many feel that it is unnecessary to
> route all FBX traffic through TOR.
Tor hidden services don't rely on DNS exactly, but they do rely on the
authoritative directory servers in Tor. These are six or so Tor
directory servers hard-coded into the Tor source code that dictate what
is or isn't in the mainline Tor network. They're run by people tapped by
the Tor Project, and while I suppose I trust them more than the people
that run DNS, they're still human, and there are only ~six (no more than
ten) of them.
One thing you might be able to do is have an augmented Tor network, with
a directory that was propagated socially between FreedomBoxes in the
same way the SKS keyserver propagates OpenPGP keys.
This is a long-standing P2P systems research problem, though. The
existing solutions (and an interesting and novel approach that I quite
like) are summed up in this paper from the GNUnet team:
<http://grothoff.org/christian/bootstrap.pdf>
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