Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote tallying
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This GR was first broached on December 14th, 18th and 19th,
2000, by Raul Miller. A election methods committee was set up to
examine the issue and come up with recommendations, and a cast of
characters got together to put this final form in place. The
discussion was revived on Aug 21st, 2002, where the recommendations
of the committee were further refined (espescially adding the super
majority mechanisms) by people on this mailing list.
I would like to thank, in particular, Raul Miller, Mike
Ossipoff, Norman Petry, Anthony Towns, Buddha Buck, Jochen Voss, and
several other contributors from the mailing list who helped this
along. I apologize to the people whose name I haven't mentioned; lack
of space prohibits me from expresseing my appreciation adequately.
I am formally proposing that we adopt this resolution be
adopted, and I am asking for seconds for this resolution; we need at
least 5 other developers to second this for this to go anywhere.
Constitutional amendment: Condorcet/Clone Proof SSD vote tallying:
Under 4.2 Procedure [for developers during a general resolution or
election], change item 3 to read:
3. Votes are taken by the Project Secretary. Votes, tallies, and
results are not revealed during the voting period; after the
vote the Project Secretary lists all the votes cast. The voting
period is 2 weeks, but may be varied by up to 1 week by the
Under 5.2 Appointment of project leader, change item 7 to read:
7. The decision will be made using the method specified in section
A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure. The quorum is the
same as for a General Resolution (s.4.2) and the default
option is "None Of The Above".
Under 6.1 Powers [of the technical committee], change item 7 to read:
7. Appoint the Chairman of the Technical Committee. The Chairman
is elected by the Committee from its members. All members of
the committee are automatically nominated; the committee votes
starting one week before the post will become vacant (or
immediately, if it is already too late). The members may vote
by public acclamation for any fellow committee member,
including themselves; there is no default option. The vote
finishes when all the members have voted, or when the voting
period has ended. The result is determined using the method
specified in section A.6 of the Standard Resolution Procedure.
Under A.2 Calling for a vote, change items 2 and 4 to read
2. The proposer or any sponsor of a resolution may call for a vote on that
resolution and all related amendments.
4. The minimum discussion period is counted from the time the last
formal amendment was accepted, or since the whole resolution
was proposed if no amendments have been proposed and accepted.
Replace A.3 with:
A.3. Voting procedure
1. Each resolution and its related amendments is voted on in a
single ballot that includes an option for the original
resolution, each amendment, and the default option (where
2. The default option must not have any supermajority requirements.
Options which do not have an explicit supermajority requirement
have a 1:1 majority requirement.
3. The votes are counted according to the the rules in A.6. The
default option is "Further Discussion", unless specified
4. In cases of doubt the Project Secretary shall decide on matters
Replace A.5 with:
If a proposed resolution has not been discussed, amended, voted on or
otherwise dealt with for 4 weeks the secretary may issue a statement
that the issue is being withdrawn. If none of the sponsors of any
of the proposals object within a week, the issue is withdrawn.
The secretary may also include suggestions on how to proceed,
Replace A.6 with:
A.6 Vote Counting
1. Each voter's ballot ranks the options being voted on. Not all
options need be ranked. Ranked options are considered
preferred to all unranked options. Voters may rank options
equally. Unranked options are considered to be ranked equally
with one another. Details of how ballots may be filled out
will be included in the Call For Votes.
2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R any options other
than the default option which do not receive at least R votes
ranking that option above the default option are dropped from
3. Any (non-default) option which does not defeat the default option
by its required majority ratio is dropped from consideration.
a. Given two options A and B, V(A,B) is the number of voters
who prefer option A over option B.
b. An option A defeats the default option D by a majority
ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A).
c. If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority ratio
is S; otherwise, its majority ratio is 1.
4. From the list of undropped options, we generate a list of
a. An option A defeats an option B, if V(A,B) is strictly greater
5. From the list of [undropped] pairwise defeats, we generate a
set of transitive defeats.
a. An option A transitively defeats an option C if A defeats
C or if there is some other option B where A defeats B AND
B transitively defeats C.
6. We construct the Schwartz set from the set of transitive defeats.
a. An option A is in the Schwartz set if for all options B,
either A transitively defeats B, or B does not transitively
7. If there are defeats between options in the Schwartz set,
we drop the weakest such defeats from the list of pairwise
defeats, and return to step 5.
a. A defeat (A,X) is weaker than a defeat (B,Y) if V(A,X)
is less than V(B,Y). Also, (A,X) is weaker than (B,Y) if
V(A,X) is equal to V(B,Y) and V(X,A) is greater than V(Y,B).
b. A weakest defeat is a defeat that has no other defeat weaker
than it. There may be more than one such defeat.
8. If there are no defeats within the Schwartz set, then the winner
is chosen from the options in the Schwartz set. If there is
only one such option, it is the winner. If there are multiple
options, the elector with the casting vote chooses which of those
RATIONALE: Options which the voters rank above the default option
are options they find acceptable. Options ranked below the default
options are options they find unacceptable.
If the Constitutional rules are strictly followed, then, by rule 3,
all options that are dominated [pairwise beaten] by at least one other
option are discarded, and references to them in the ballot papers will
be ignored. That means that unless there's an "undominated"
alternative ("option"), every alternative will be discarded and
deleted from the ballots.
We've had a number of problems from ambiguities in our constitutional
vote tallying procedure. Changing the voting procedure would give us
the same results on historical votes as the existing procedure, and
would not suffer the ambiguities of the current procedure.
Confessions may be good for the soul, but they are bad for the
reputation. Lord Thomas Dewar
Manoj Srivastava <email@example.com> <http://www.debian.org/%7Esrivasta/>
1024R/C7261095 print CB D9 F4 12 68 07 E4 05 CC 2D 27 12 1D F5 E8 6E
1024D/BF24424C print 4966 F272 D093 B493 410B 924B 21BA DABB BF24 424C
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