Re: Better quorum change proposal (with justification)
It may be noted that my example involves on a fair number of people
ranking A *equal* to the default option.
It's possible to prohibit this, which would certainly simplify some
things. However, I think it is perfectly legitimate for someone to
consider something to be of equal value to the default option.
This could be interpreted as "interest" and credited towards the quorum.
So that's another good possibility, which kills some of the problems
(though not all; see below).
--
Manoj's current proposal effectively makes ranking A=D the same as
ranking A below D whenever quorum is relevant.
Except that it gives perverse results from a Condorcet point of view.
Consider if all the people who, in my original example, ranked A=D,
instead ranked A *below* D.
19x ADB
19x ABD
1x BDA
A vs. B
38 to 1
D vs. A
20 to 19
B vs. D
20 to 19
There's no Condorcet winner. Using SSD, without quorum, either A or D
wins (chosen by the "elector with the casting vote", a.k.a. the project
leader!).
With Manoj's quorum, A is eliminated and B wins by a hair, same as with
the equal rankings. But 38 people prefer A to B and only 1 person
prefers B to A. Now B is implemented. Some people may think that this
is desirable, of course. I certainly don't.
--
Consider my original example:
19x A=DB
19x ABD
1x BA=D
Under Manoj's system, B wins! B is implemented!
A new ballot ("Fix the results of the stupid ballot we just had!")
proposes A vs. "Keep the present system" (B) vs. "more discussion" (D).
The first set of voters hated B and want to get rid of it before
discussing things further, so they change their votes:
19x ADB
19x ABD
1x BA=D
Now A wins over each other option by a lot. Woo hoo!
This is just a stupid result.
Of course, there's also John's stupid result:
Quorum 20
19x ABD
1x BDA
A vs. B
19 to 1
B vs. D
20 to 0
A vs. D
19 to 0 (fails quorum!)
B wins, under Manoj's system. Aack!
---
The problems are not really present for the Technical Committee, since
the quorum is 2. For technical reasons, this cannot cause any odd
behavior.
--
It also seems unlikely for the aforementioned problems to happen in a GR
when the number of voters is >=2*R, where R is the quorum requirement.
Unfortunately, it *can* happen with an arbitrarily large number of
voters.
How? When there are lots of options and lots of rankings equal to
the default option, as well as a highly splintered electorate. It's
pretty easy to construct by adding voters to my first example who vote
A=B=D and have preferences about other things (but not enough to make
any of them win).
--Nathanael
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