Re: Problems with the majority requirement
On Fri, May 30, 2003 at 03:22:21PM -0400, Andrew Pimlott wrote:
> 1. A voter who sincerely prefers the default over some other option
> is in effect pursuing a "meta-strategy"--ie, one that is outside the
> voting system per se.
I guess you mean that if the vote defaults the issue is not resolved by
> However, a voting system (such as the
> proposed) that gives extra weight to the default option effectively
> promotes this meta-strategy. I leave to others to decide on the
> value or harm of this meta-strategy--if you think that there should
> be an avenue for obstructionism, you probably don't see this as a
I guess you mean that we require a majority of participating voters to
approve the winning option.
> 2. A voter who sincerely prefers some option over the default may
> still have an incentive to vote the default higher. By weakening
> the demoted option, he may cause his favorite to win.
Or he may cause the vote to default (where, as a general rule, most of
the options aren't especially popular). Or, he may cause his favorite
to lose (where, as a general rule, most of the options are popular but
people have differing ideas of which is best).
> This is true
> in straight Condorcet systems, but is more likely in the proposed
> system, given the "knockout punch" of the default option.
Actually, it depends on what other people think. It's certainly not an
"always succeeds" strategy.
> 3a. Due to the inherent meaning of the default option, voters will
> typically not consider it especially undesirable (unless they
> strongly feel that a revote will create tension or damage Debian's
This is only true for voters who think that the vote will not accomplish
> This inclines voters to insincerely promote the
> default option, since causing the default to win is a small penalty.
> Arguably, a voting system should counterbalance this inclination.
Here, you seem to be saying that the voting system should force people to
choose between the lesser of two evils, even when they're opposed to both.
>  As an aside, there is a case that vexes me considerably, and it
> pertains to pure Condorcet/CpSSD. Say you have sincere preferences
> 8 ABC A>B 8:7 A wins
> 7 BAC A>C 15:5
> 5 C B>C 15:5
> If only A swaps B and C, the outcome is the same. If only B swaps A
> and C, B wins in the tie-break (A>B 8:7, C>A 12:8, B>C 15:5). If
> both swap, C wins outright.
I don't have a clue what you're saying, here. A is an option, how can
an option swap two other options?