Bug#381677: initramfs-tools: Temporary files and initramfs world-readable
On Sun, 06 Aug 2006, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote:
> The generated initramfs is world-readable (as well as the temporary
> files); this leaks cryptographic keys (in password-protected form) to
> all users on the system when the root fs is encrypted (because these
> keys then get copied to the initramfs, at least in the loop-aes
> case). See bug #378488 for a discussion of this in the context of
yaird installs initrd.img with 600 without giving any further
reasons -> see #336454
no reply from maintainer since bug is filed.
> This patch fixes that. As making these files running user only
> readable does not, as far as I can see, hurt even when not strictly
> necessary, the patch just does it unconditionnaly.
> Please apply (or comment). Thanks.
i'd have waited for someone else to voice there concerns.
i like the initramfs-tools initrd.img to be debuggable as
user (quick check of their contents).
also loop-aes is quite a specific use case,
so i'm not in big favour of setting the umask in general
to the proposed value as in general there is no gpg key
in the initramfs.