In<[🔎] 4D9D1B22.2010608@cox.net>, Ron Johnson wrote:
On 04/06/2011 08:19 PM, Aaron Toponce wrote:
First, if you don't have the salt, but you do have the hash, then a
rainbow table attack is completely pointless.
The OS must store the salt somewhere, in order to correctly authenticate
the user when he logs in. But I've never heard of /etc/hashsalt so what
am I misunderstanding?
The value stored in /etc/shadow is both the salt + the encrypted
salt+password. This allows a process with read access to /etc/shadow to
easily read the shadow, encrypt the salt + provided password, and compare the
result to the encrypted salt+password. The salt is randomly generated each
time the password is set, and it (usually) different for each entry in
/etc/shadow.
Salted MD5 is still considered secure, even with the known attacks against
MD5. Salted SHA1 has no attacks more effective than brute-force. I'd like to
believe that shadow passwords will more to SHA3 within 2-3 releases after SHA3
is finalized. At the current rate of attack improvements against MD5, that
should be plenty of time.