RE: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT] Disambiguation of 4.1.5)
On Tue, 21 Nov 2000, Norman Petry wrote:
> status quo, it must do so against 3-1 odds (or whatever). Therefore, to
> determine the winner, just multiply the votes for the status quo by 3
> against every alternative before comparing. For example, suppose we have
> the following pair of vote totals:
...
> the ballot as well. The above election, using Concorde voting should
> therefore result in a single ranked ballot with the following options:
>
> A) Resolution
> B) Resolution+Amendment (counter-proposal, in this case)
> C) Status Quo/Further discussion
>
> The only things that should be required (for sanity's sake ;-) are:
>
> 1) all proposals must be *germane*, that is, they address the same issue as
> the original proposal, but in different ways
> 2) all proposals have the same majority requirement (see above).
****
If you divide the votes for, rather than multiply the votes against, there
is no requirement that they all need the same majority.
See A.6.7, which already defines how this works, although leaves the
question of mixed ballots undefined. (although there's always a mixed
ballot, since 'NO' and 'Further Discussion' will never require a
supermajority)
<<<
If a supermajority is required the number of Yes votes in the final ballot
is reduced by an appropriate factor. Strictly speaking, for a
supermajority of F:A, the number of ballots which prefer Yes to X (when
considering whether Yes Dominates X or X Dominates Yes) or the number of
ballots whose first (remaining) preference is Yes (when doing STV
comparisons for winner and elimination purposes) is multiplied by a factor
A/F before the comparison is done. This means that a 2:1 vote, for
example, means twice as many people voted for as against; abstentions are
not counted.
>>>
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