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Re: making Debian secure by default



* On 2024 01 Apr 23:41 -0500, tomas@tuxteam.de wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 01, 2024 at 03:19:18PM -0500, Nate Bargmann wrote:
> > * On 2024 01 Apr 14:01 -0500, Andy Smith wrote:
> 
> [...]
> 
> > Until now, who anticipated this?  I'm sure there are security
> > researchers who have and it's likely that I'm not well-read enough on
> > this topic to have seen it discussed.  How many people did it occur to
> > that when A links to B and B links to C that C can create a
> > vulnerability in A?  That is what I understand happened here.
> 
> This pattern has been seen in other contexts. Here [1] is a good review
> of "supply chain attacks", which unsurprisingly happen most often in
> decentrally managed package distributions which at the same time have
> "production environments" where time-to-deploy is the main mover: npm,
> PyPi and RubyGems. If you don't have the time to even consider what the
> hundreds of packages you're ploughing into your app actually do, this
> is no surprise.

If you have Rust and Go in mind, I am hugely skeptical of both, not
because of the languages themselves but because both, from what I see,
do not lend themselves easily to a set of known curated packages that
can be used for development.

Noted Debian developer Ian Jackson wrote a blog post back on 21 March
detailing the extra steps necessary to *only* use Debian Rust packages:

https://diziet.dreamwidth.org/18122.html

> So yes, the pattern was known. It was, up to now, pretty unusual in
> this context. But the deeper "the stack" becomes... (so I think Nate
> had a point. That Andy read that as a "systemd insult" is IMHO
> infortunate, because it clogs a potentially useful discussion. But
> there you are).

I think Andy was responding to Jacob Bachmeyer's use of "katamari" to
describe systemd/libsystemd which he uses again in:

https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/automake/2024-04/msg00015.html

As far as I know, Jacob is not on this list so discussing his opinion is
a bit unfair to him.

> The next level is using a package phantasized by your trusty "AI" [2]
> counsellor (and whose name was predicted by a malicious actor, because 
> "AI" tends to phantasize names consistently). Note that this one was
> just (yet?) a proof of concept.

I am guessing that the Jia Tan actor(s) are watching the response to
this event carefully.  I doubt they have been deterred.

- Nate

-- 
"The optimist proclaims that we live in the best of all
possible worlds.  The pessimist fears this is true."
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