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Re: safety of encrypted filesystems



also sprach Michael Buchholz <michael@bubi.dnsalias.net> [2005.06.17.0857 +0200]:
> If it would be that way, it would allways be necessary to decrypt
> the whole filesystem, when you want to read the last block. Or you
> have to store a decrypted version in memory...

No, it would not. You only need access to the immediately preceeding
block, since its *cipherdata* are used to encrypt the current block.

> And also, when you write any block, you have to reencrypt all the
> remaining blocks.

Yes, don't you?

> I don't know, what kind of CPU you use, but on my system, that
> would be really time consuming!!!

Just one of those 100 GHz low-end consumer products with 128 cores.
And you? :)

> The loss of a single block on a harddist "should" be protected by
> using some kind of "forward error correction" like the
> Solomon-Reed one.

But *is* it?

Before I put my data into a cipher file, I sure as hell want to
know...

What I find a bit peculiar: I have made an 8Mb test file in fs.img,
and I overwrite a small part of it:

  (dd if=fs.img bs=1 count=10000; dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=8;
    dd if=fs.img bs=1 skip=10008) >| fs2.img

When I mount fs2.img, I get no error... what gives?

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