Your message dated Sat, 07 Oct 2023 09:59:39 +0000 with message-id <E1qp45z-00A4BA-0h@coccia.debian.org> and subject line Released with 12.2 has caused the Debian Bug report #1042058, regarding bookworm-pu: package pandoc/2.17.1.1-2~deb12u1 to be marked as done. This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with. If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith. (NB: If you are a system administrator and have no idea what this message is talking about, this may indicate a serious mail system misconfiguration somewhere. Please contact owner@bugs.debian.org immediately.) -- 1042058: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1042058 Debian Bug Tracking System Contact owner@bugs.debian.org with problems
--- Begin Message ---
- To: Debian Bug Tracking System <submit@bugs.debian.org>
- Subject: bookworm-pu: package pandoc/2.17.1.1-2~deb12u1
- From: Guilhem Moulin <guilhem@debian.org>
- Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 23:40:45 +0200
- Message-id: <ZMBBXTJipmhV04SH@debian.org>
Package: release.debian.org Severity: normal Tags: bookworm User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org Usertags: pu X-Debbugs-Cc: pandoc@packages.debian.org, Guilhem Moulin <guilhem@debian.org> Control: affects -1 + src:pandoc [ Reason ] pandoc 2.17.1.1-1.1 is vulnerable to CVE-2023-35936: Arbitrary file write vulnerability via specially crafted image element in the input when generating files using the `--extract-media` option or outputting to PDF format. The Security Team decided not to issue a DSA for that CVE, but it's now fixed in buster-security (2.2.1-3+deb10u1) as well as sid (2.17.1.1-2), so it makes sense to fix it via (o)s-pu too. [ Impact ] For users uprading from buster-security to bookworm, that would be a security regression. [ Tests ] A new unit test was added upstream, and backported along with the code fixes. I also manually verified that the PoC were fixed. [ Risks ] Regression risks are low: all upstream commits applied cleanly, and test coverage is good. (Upstream changes to pandoc.cabal are a no-op as far as debian packaging is concerned.) [ Checklist ] [x] *all* changes are documented in the d/changelog [x] I reviewed all changes and I approve them [x] attach debdiff against the package in stable [x] the issue is verified as fixed in unstable [ Changes ] * Add d/salsa-ci.yml for Salsa CI. * Fix CVE-2023-35936 and CVE-2023-38745: Arbitrary file write vulnerability via specially crafted image element in the input when generating files using the `--extract-media` option or outputting to PDF format. (Closes: #1041976) -- Guilhem.diffstat for pandoc-2.17.1.1 pandoc-2.17.1.1 changelog | 17 +++++ copyright_hints | 6 + patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch | 24 +++++++ patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++ patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ patches/series | 6 + salsa-ci.yml | 9 ++ 10 files changed, 492 insertions(+) diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/changelog pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/changelog --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/changelog 2022-11-19 14:13:51.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/changelog 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,3 +1,20 @@ +pandoc (2.17.1.1-2~deb12u1) bookworm; urgency=high + + * Non-maintainer upload. + * Rebuild for bookworm. + * Add d/salsa-ci.yml for Salsa CI. + + -- Guilhem Moulin <guilhem@debian.org> Tue, 25 Jul 2023 23:01:50 +0200 + +pandoc (2.17.1.1-2) unstable; urgency=high + + * add patches cherry-picked upstream + to fix arbitrary file write vulnerability; + closes: bug#1041976, thanks to Guilhem Moulin; + CVE-2023-35936 CVE-2023-35936 + + -- Jonas Smedegaard <dr@jones.dk> Tue, 25 Jul 2023 18:43:57 +0200 + pandoc (2.17.1.1-1.1) unstable; urgency=low * Non-maintainer upload. diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/copyright_hints pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/copyright_hints --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/copyright_hints 2022-08-13 16:27:42.000000000 +0200 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/copyright_hints 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -236,6 +236,12 @@ debian/pandoc.lintian-overrides debian/patches/020220218~2a70d9c.patch debian/patches/020220531~9aff861.patch + debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch + debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch + debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch + debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch + debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch + debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch debian/patches/series debian/rules debian/source/format diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230620~5e381e3.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +Description: fix a security vulnerability in MediaBag and T.P.Class.IO.writeMedia + This vulnerability, discovered by Entroy C, + allows users to write arbitrary files to any location + by feeding pandoc a specially crafted URL in an image element. + The vulnerability is serious + for anyone using pandoc to process untrusted input. + The vulnerability does not affect pandoc + when run with the `--sandbox` flag. +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/5e381e3 +Author: John MacFarlane <jgm@berkeley.edu> +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936 +Forwarded: yes +Last-Update: 2023-07-25 +--- +This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/ +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs +@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ + import Network.HTTP.Client.TLS (mkManagerSettings) + import Network.HTTP.Types.Header ( hContentType ) + import Network.Socket (withSocketsDo) +-import Network.URI (unEscapeString) ++import Network.URI (URI(..), parseURI) + import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing) + import System.Environment (getEnv) + import System.FilePath ((</>), takeDirectory, normalise) +@@ -120,11 +120,11 @@ + + openURL :: (PandocMonad m, MonadIO m) => Text -> m (B.ByteString, Maybe MimeType) + openURL u +- | Just u'' <- T.stripPrefix "data:" u = do +- let mime = T.takeWhile (/=',') u'' +- let contents = UTF8.fromString $ +- unEscapeString $ T.unpack $ T.drop 1 $ T.dropWhile (/=',') u'' +- return (decodeLenient contents, Just mime) ++ | Just (URI{ uriScheme = "data:", ++ uriPath = upath }) <- parseURI (T.unpack u) = do ++ let (mime, rest) = break (== '.') upath ++ let contents = UTF8.fromString $ drop 1 rest ++ return (decodeLenient contents, Just (T.pack mime)) + | otherwise = do + let toReqHeader (n, v) = (CI.mk (UTF8.fromText n), UTF8.fromText v) + customHeaders <- map toReqHeader <$> getsCommonState stRequestHeaders +@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ + -> m () + writeMedia dir (fp, _mt, bs) = do + -- we normalize to get proper path separators for the platform +- let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> unEscapeString fp ++ let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> fp + liftIOError (createDirectoryIfMissing True) (takeDirectory fullpath) + logIOError $ BL.writeFile fullpath bs + +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs +@@ -28,12 +28,13 @@ + import qualified Data.Map as M + import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe, isNothing) + import Data.Typeable (Typeable) ++import Network.URI (unEscapeString) + import System.FilePath + import Text.Pandoc.MIME (MimeType, getMimeTypeDef, extensionFromMimeType) + import Data.Text (Text) + import qualified Data.Text as T + import Data.Digest.Pure.SHA (sha1, showDigest) +-import Network.URI (URI (..), parseURI) ++import Network.URI (URI (..), parseURI, isURI) + + data MediaItem = + MediaItem +@@ -52,9 +53,12 @@ + instance Show MediaBag where + show bag = "MediaBag " ++ show (mediaDirectory bag) + +--- | We represent paths with /, in normalized form. ++-- | We represent paths with /, in normalized form. Percent-encoding ++-- is resolved. + canonicalize :: FilePath -> Text +-canonicalize = T.replace "\\" "/" . T.pack . normalise ++canonicalize fp ++ | isURI fp = T.pack fp ++ | otherwise = T.replace "\\" "/" . T.pack . normalise . unEscapeString $ fp + + -- | Delete a media item from a 'MediaBag', or do nothing if no item corresponds + -- to the given path. +@@ -77,22 +81,22 @@ + , mediaContents = contents + , mediaMimeType = mt } + fp' = canonicalize fp ++ fp'' = T.unpack fp' + uri = parseURI fp +- newpath = if isRelative fp ++ newpath = if isRelative fp'' + && isNothing uri +- && ".." `notElem` splitDirectories fp +- then T.unpack fp' ++ && not (".." `T.isInfixOf` fp') ++ then fp'' + else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> "." <> ext +- fallback = case takeExtension fp of +- ".gz" -> getMimeTypeDef $ dropExtension fp +- _ -> getMimeTypeDef fp ++ fallback = case takeExtension fp'' of ++ ".gz" -> getMimeTypeDef $ dropExtension fp'' ++ _ -> getMimeTypeDef fp'' + mt = fromMaybe fallback mbMime +- path = maybe fp uriPath uri ++ path = maybe fp'' (unEscapeString . uriPath) uri + ext = case takeExtension path of + '.':e -> e + _ -> maybe "" T.unpack $ extensionFromMimeType mt + +- + -- | Lookup a media item in a 'MediaBag', returning mime type and contents. + lookupMedia :: FilePath + -> MediaBag diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.1~54561e9.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +Description: fix bug in git commit 5e381e3 + In the new code a comma mysteriously turned into a period. + This would have prevented proper separation + of the mime type and content in data uris. + Thanks to @hseg for catching this. +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/54561e9 +Author: John MacFarlane <jgm@berkeley.edu> +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936 +Forwarded: yes +Last-Update: 2023-07-25 +--- +This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/ +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs +@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ + openURL u + | Just (URI{ uriScheme = "data:", + uriPath = upath }) <- parseURI (T.unpack u) = do +- let (mime, rest) = break (== '.') upath ++ let (mime, rest) = break (== ',') upath + let contents = UTF8.fromString $ drop 1 rest + return (decodeLenient contents, Just (T.pack mime)) + | otherwise = do diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.2~df4f13b.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +Description: more fixes to git commit 5e381e3 + These changes recognize that parseURI does not unescape the path. + . + Another change is that the canonical form + of the path used as the MediaBag key + retains percent-encoding, if present; + we only unescape the string when writing to a file. + . + Some tests are needed before the issue can be closed. +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/df4f13b +Author: John MacFarlane <jgm@berkeley.edu> +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/issues/8918 +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936 +Forwarded: yes +Last-Update: 2023-07-25 +--- +This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/ +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs +@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ + import Network.HTTP.Client.TLS (mkManagerSettings) + import Network.HTTP.Types.Header ( hContentType ) + import Network.Socket (withSocketsDo) +-import Network.URI (URI(..), parseURI) ++import Network.URI (URI(..), parseURI, unEscapeString) + import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing) + import System.Environment (getEnv) + import System.FilePath ((</>), takeDirectory, normalise) +@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ + openURL u + | Just (URI{ uriScheme = "data:", + uriPath = upath }) <- parseURI (T.unpack u) = do +- let (mime, rest) = break (== ',') upath ++ let (mime, rest) = break (== ',') $ unEscapeString upath + let contents = UTF8.fromString $ drop 1 rest + return (decodeLenient contents, Just (T.pack mime)) + | otherwise = do +@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ + -> m () + writeMedia dir (fp, _mt, bs) = do + -- we normalize to get proper path separators for the platform +- let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> fp ++ let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> unEscapeString fp + liftIOError (createDirectoryIfMissing True) (takeDirectory fullpath) + logIOError $ BL.writeFile fullpath bs + +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs +@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ + import qualified Data.Text as T + import Data.Digest.Pure.SHA (sha1, showDigest) + import Network.URI (URI (..), parseURI, isURI) ++import Data.List (isInfixOf) + + data MediaItem = + MediaItem +@@ -54,11 +55,11 @@ + show bag = "MediaBag " ++ show (mediaDirectory bag) + + -- | We represent paths with /, in normalized form. Percent-encoding +--- is resolved. ++-- is not resolved. + canonicalize :: FilePath -> Text + canonicalize fp + | isURI fp = T.pack fp +- | otherwise = T.replace "\\" "/" . T.pack . normalise . unEscapeString $ fp ++ | otherwise = T.replace "\\" "/" . T.pack . normalise $ fp + + -- | Delete a media item from a 'MediaBag', or do nothing if no item corresponds + -- to the given path. +@@ -81,11 +82,11 @@ + , mediaContents = contents + , mediaMimeType = mt } + fp' = canonicalize fp +- fp'' = T.unpack fp' ++ fp'' = unEscapeString $ T.unpack fp' + uri = parseURI fp + newpath = if isRelative fp'' + && isNothing uri +- && not (".." `T.isInfixOf` fp') ++ && not (".." `isInfixOf` fp'') + then fp'' + else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> "." <> ext + fallback = case takeExtension fp'' of diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.3~fe62da6.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +Description: add tests for fillMediaBag/extractMedia +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/fe62da6 +Author: John MacFarlane <jgm@berkeley.edu> +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936 +Forwarded: yes +Last-Update: 2023-07-25 +--- +This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/ +--- a/pandoc.cabal ++++ b/pandoc.cabal +@@ -791,6 +791,7 @@ + tasty-lua >= 1.0 && < 1.1, + tasty-quickcheck >= 0.8 && < 0.11, + text >= 1.1.1.0 && < 2.1, ++ temporary >= 1.1 && < 1.4, + time >= 1.5 && < 1.14, + xml >= 1.3.12 && < 1.4, + zip-archive >= 0.2.3.4 && < 0.5 +@@ -800,6 +801,7 @@ + Tests.Lua + Tests.Lua.Module + Tests.Shared ++ Tests.MediaBag + Tests.Readers.LaTeX + Tests.Readers.HTML + Tests.Readers.JATS +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs +@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ ++{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} ++module Tests.MediaBag (tests) where ++ ++import Test.Tasty ++import Test.Tasty.HUnit ++-- import Tests.Helpers ++import Text.Pandoc.Class (extractMedia, fillMediaBag, runIOorExplode) ++import System.IO.Temp (withTempDirectory) ++import System.FilePath ++import Text.Pandoc.Builder as B ++import System.Directory (doesFileExist, copyFile, setCurrentDirectory, getCurrentDirectory) ++ ++tests :: [TestTree] ++tests = [ ++ testCase "test fillMediaBag & extractMedia" $ ++ withTempDirectory "." "extractMediaTest" $ \tmpdir -> do ++ olddir <- getCurrentDirectory ++ setCurrentDirectory tmpdir ++ copyFile "../../test/lalune.jpg" "moon.jpg" ++ let d = B.doc $ ++ B.para (B.image "../../test/lalune.jpg" "" mempty) <> ++ B.para (B.image "moon.jpg" "" mempty) <> ++ B.para (B.image "data://image/png;base64,cHJpbnQgImhlbGxvIgo=;.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fa%2elua" "" mempty) <> ++ B.para (B.image "" "" mempty) ++ runIOorExplode $ do ++ fillMediaBag d ++ extractMedia "foo" d ++ exists1 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "moon.jpg") ++ assertBool "file in directory extract with original name" exists1 ++ exists2 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "f9d88c3dbe18f6a7f5670e994a947d51216cdf0e.jpg") ++ assertBool "file above directory extracted with hashed name" exists2 ++ exists3 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua") ++ exists4 <- doesFileExist "a.lua" ++ assertBool "data uri with malicious payload does not get written to arbitrary location" ++ (exists3 && not exists4) ++ exists5 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "d5fceb6532643d0d84ffe09c40c481ecdf59e15a.gif") ++ assertBool "data uri with gif is properly decoded" exists5 ++ setCurrentDirectory olddir ++ ] +--- a/test/test-pandoc.hs ++++ b/test/test-pandoc.hs +@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ + import qualified Tests.Writers.AnnotatedTable + import qualified Tests.Writers.TEI + import qualified Tests.Writers.Markua ++import qualified Tests.MediaBag + import Text.Pandoc.Shared (inDirectory) + + tests :: FilePath -> TestTree +@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ + [ Tests.Command.tests + , testGroup "Old" (Tests.Old.tests pandocPath) + , testGroup "Shared" Tests.Shared.tests ++ , testGroup "MediaBag" Tests.MediaBag.tests + , testGroup "Writers" + [ testGroup "Native" Tests.Writers.Native.tests + , testGroup "ConTeXt" Tests.Writers.ConTeXt.tests diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230623.4~5246f02.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +Description: improve tests for fillMediaBag/extractMedia + Ensure that the current directory is not changed up if a test fails, + and fix messages for the assertion failures. +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/5246f02 +Author: John MacFarlane <jgm@berkeley.edu> +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-35936 +Forwarded: yes +Last-Update: 2023-07-25 +--- +This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/ +--- a/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs ++++ b/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs +@@ -6,16 +6,15 @@ + -- import Tests.Helpers + import Text.Pandoc.Class (extractMedia, fillMediaBag, runIOorExplode) + import System.IO.Temp (withTempDirectory) ++import Text.Pandoc.Shared (inDirectory) + import System.FilePath + import Text.Pandoc.Builder as B +-import System.Directory (doesFileExist, copyFile, setCurrentDirectory, getCurrentDirectory) ++import System.Directory (doesFileExist, copyFile) + + tests :: [TestTree] + tests = [ + testCase "test fillMediaBag & extractMedia" $ +- withTempDirectory "." "extractMediaTest" $ \tmpdir -> do +- olddir <- getCurrentDirectory +- setCurrentDirectory tmpdir ++ withTempDirectory "." "extractMediaTest" $ \tmpdir -> inDirectory tmpdir $ do + copyFile "../../test/lalune.jpg" "moon.jpg" + let d = B.doc $ + B.para (B.image "../../test/lalune.jpg" "" mempty) <> +@@ -26,14 +25,13 @@ + fillMediaBag d + extractMedia "foo" d + exists1 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "moon.jpg") +- assertBool "file in directory extract with original name" exists1 ++ assertBool "file in directory is not extracted with original name" exists1 + exists2 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "f9d88c3dbe18f6a7f5670e994a947d51216cdf0e.jpg") +- assertBool "file above directory extracted with hashed name" exists2 ++ assertBool "file above directory is not extracted with hashed name" exists2 + exists3 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua") + exists4 <- doesFileExist "a.lua" +- assertBool "data uri with malicious payload does not get written to arbitrary location" ++ assertBool "data uri with malicious payload gets written outside of destination dir" + (exists3 && not exists4) + exists5 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "d5fceb6532643d0d84ffe09c40c481ecdf59e15a.gif") +- assertBool "data uri with gif is properly decoded" exists5 +- setCurrentDirectory olddir ++ assertBool "data uri with gif is not properly decoded" exists5 + ] diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/020230720~eddedbf.patch 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +Description: ix new variant of the vulnerability in CVE-2023-35936 + Guilhem Moulin noticed that the fix to CVE-2023-35936 was incomplete. + An attacker could get around it + by double-encoding the malicious extension + to create or override arbitrary files. + . + $ echo '' >b.md + $ .cabal/bin/pandoc b.md --extract-media=bar + <p><img + src="bar/2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fb%2elua" /></p> + $ cat b.lua + print "hello" + $ find bar + bar/ + bar/2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua+ + . + This commit adds a test case for this more complex attack + and fixes the vulnerability. + (The fix is quite simple: + if the URL-unescaped filename or extension contains a '%', + we just use the sha1 hash of the contents as the canonical name, + just as we do if the filename contains '..'.) +Origin: upstream, https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/commit/eddedbf +Author: John MacFarlane <jgm@berkeley.edu> +Bug: https://github.com/jgm/pandoc/security/advisories/GHSA-xj5q-fv23-575g +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-38745 +Forwarded: yes +Last-Update: 2023-07-25 +--- +This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/ +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs +@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ + -> m () + writeMedia dir (fp, _mt, bs) = do + -- we normalize to get proper path separators for the platform ++ -- we unescape URI encoding, but given how insertMedia ++ -- is written, we shouldn't have any % in a canonical media name... + let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> unEscapeString fp + liftIOError (createDirectoryIfMissing True) (takeDirectory fullpath) + logIOError $ BL.writeFile fullpath bs +--- a/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs ++++ b/src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs +@@ -87,16 +87,17 @@ + newpath = if isRelative fp'' + && isNothing uri + && not (".." `isInfixOf` fp'') ++ && '%' `notElem` fp'' + then fp'' +- else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> "." <> ext ++ else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> ext + fallback = case takeExtension fp'' of + ".gz" -> getMimeTypeDef $ dropExtension fp'' + _ -> getMimeTypeDef fp'' + mt = fromMaybe fallback mbMime + path = maybe fp'' (unEscapeString . uriPath) uri + ext = case takeExtension path of +- '.':e -> e +- _ -> maybe "" T.unpack $ extensionFromMimeType mt ++ '.':e | '%' `notElem` e -> '.':e ++ _ -> maybe "" (\x -> '.':T.unpack x) $ extensionFromMimeType mt + + -- | Lookup a media item in a 'MediaBag', returning mime type and contents. + lookupMedia :: FilePath +--- a/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs ++++ b/test/Tests/MediaBag.hs +@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ + let d = B.doc $ + B.para (B.image "../../test/lalune.jpg" "" mempty) <> + B.para (B.image "moon.jpg" "" mempty) <> +- B.para (B.image "data://image/png;base64,cHJpbnQgImhlbGxvIgo=;.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fa%2elua" "" mempty) <> ++ B.para (B.image ";.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fa%2elua" "" mempty) <> + B.para (B.image "" "" mempty) + runIOorExplode $ do + fillMediaBag d +@@ -34,4 +34,14 @@ + (exists3 && not exists4) + exists5 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "d5fceb6532643d0d84ffe09c40c481ecdf59e15a.gif") + assertBool "data uri with gif is not properly decoded" exists5 ++ -- double-encoded version: ++ let e = B.doc $ ++ B.para (B.image ";.lua+%252f%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fb%252elua" "" mempty) ++ runIOorExplode $ do ++ fillMediaBag e ++ extractMedia "bar" e ++ exists6 <- doesFileExist ("bar" </> "772ceca21a2751863ec46cb23db0e7fc35b9cff8.png") ++ exists7 <- doesFileExist "b.lua" ++ assertBool "data uri with double-encoded malicious payload gets written outside of destination dir" ++ (exists6 && not exists7) + ] diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/series pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/series --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/series 2022-08-13 16:27:42.000000000 +0200 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/patches/series 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,4 +1,10 @@ 020220218~2a70d9c.patch 020220531~9aff861.patch +020230620~5e381e3.patch +020230623.1~54561e9.patch +020230623.2~df4f13b.patch +020230623.3~fe62da6.patch +020230623.4~5246f02.patch +020230720~eddedbf.patch 2001_templates_avoid_privacy_breach.patch 2002_program_package_hint.patch diff -Nru pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/salsa-ci.yml pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/salsa-ci.yml --- pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/salsa-ci.yml 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ pandoc-2.17.1.1/debian/salsa-ci.yml 2023-07-25 23:01:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +--- +include: + - https://salsa.debian.org/salsa-ci-team/pipeline/raw/master/recipes/debian.yml + +variables: + RELEASE: 'bookworm' + SALSA_CI_DISABLE_REPROTEST: 1 + SALSA_CI_DISABLE_LINTIAN: 1 + SALSA_CI_DISABLE_BLHC: 1Attachment: signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---
- To: 1042058-done@bugs.debian.org
- Subject: Released with 12.2
- From: Jonathan Wiltshire <jmw@coccia.debian.org>
- Date: Sat, 07 Oct 2023 09:59:39 +0000
- Message-id: <E1qp45z-00A4BA-0h@coccia.debian.org>
Version: 12.2 The upload requested in this bug has been released as part of 12.2.
--- End Message ---